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When I first conceived of an investigation into Islamic law, my intention was to explore                             
and examine the thesis that Bernard Lewis first set forth in “The Roots of Muslim Rage” and                                 
Samuel Huntington later articulated in his seminal work, ​The Clash of Civilizations and the                           
Remaking of World Order​. In the “Roots of Muslim Rage,” Lewis writes,  
I​t should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far                               
transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue                       
them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but                         
surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo­Christian heritage,                     
our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important                         
that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also                             
equally irrational reaction against that rival.   1
 
In order to determine the validity of the Clash Thesis, I examined the foundations that                             
compose, undergird, and constitute any civilization, its legal system. If the basic assumptions of                           
Clash Thesis are correct, the legal system of Islamic societies should be relatively monolithic                           
instead of constituting a gradient or continuum from one part of the Islamic world to another as                                 
local conditions vary. As my case study, I examined Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, with a                                 
special emphasis upon its reform in the nineteenth century and abolition in the twentieth century.  
When I conducted my research, most of the primary source law texts that I could have                               








secondary sources, in particular academic journal articles that analyze different periods of                       
Islamic legal development during the Ottoman Empire’s long history, but whose findings had not                           
been integrated into a larger historical survey. The way that this study contributes to the existing                               
literature on Islamic law and the history of the Empire is the way that it links together many                                   
existing studies of Islamic law with an emphasis upon the impact of local conditions and                             
interactions with non­Islamic legal traditions. Discovering the extent to which Islamic law                       
reflects an ideal type, as the Clash Thesis would tend to support, or not is tremendously                               
important for future scholarship and contemporary policy debate in a number of different fields.  
Through my research, I found that Islamic law has evolved and changed in response to                             
local conditions in a similar manner to most other intellectual and institutional phenomena. Thus,                           
the extent to which one can reliably infer the character of Islamic law in a specific context by                                   
calling upon it as an ideal type is much more limited than prior studies and popular opinion                                 
would suggest. Islamic law is not a set of universal precepts of understandings that remain                             
unchanged and inviolate across the ages. On a higher level, the contingent nature of Islamic law                               
tends to undermine both traditional Orientalist and modern culturalist understandings about                     
Islamic societies such as the Clash Thesis. Examining Lewis and Huntington’s Clash Thesis is                           
not only valuable for its academic dimension, but also for the impact of the findings for forming                                 
and implementing policy. On one level, the assumption that Islamic law, and Islam, is as                             
monolithic and unchanging as the Clash Thesis purports it to be worsens the character and                             
quality of intellectual debate. On another, more immediate level, the assumption helps to                         2








Western­style modernity necessarily entails the destruction of Islamic heritage and culture.                     
While paradigms like the Clash Thesis possess a type of conceptual and aesthetic power, it is                               






























Before delving into the facts, dates, and events that compose this study, it is necessary to                               
analyze the methodological approach that structures it. A brief introduction is especially                       
necessary given the significant degree to which the foundations of the Orientalist paradigm, and                           
its later articulation in the Clash Thesis, are different from those from which this study proceeds.                               
The paradigm that Lewis and Huntington employ traces its intellectual genealogy to a prior                           
paradigm that dominated the study of the Middle­East, Orientalism. While Lewis and                       
Huntington’s paradigm is more undoubtedly more sophisticated than that of the previous                       
Orientalists, it still makes many of the assumptions as its predecessor. Thus, it is useful to                               
examine the nature of paradigms and Orientalism to understand the potential inadequacies of the                           
Clash Thesis.  
A paradigm is a set of shared commitments regarding the character of individual entities                           
and their relationships with other entities. The formation of a paradigm is necessary for two or                               
more parties to engage in any meaningful, constructive discourse because, if the two parties do                             
not share a minimum number of commitments, they will be unable to communicate and lay the                               
foundations for more advanced inquiry. In the process of paradigm formation, one forms classes                           
of entities and the relationships between them by emphasizing the common attributes of certain                           






no class that shares an attribute to the exclusion of all other classes and there are some members                                   
of a class that resemble other classes more closely than they do other members of their same                                 
class. Once a given community forms or adopts a paradigm, it appears to be the only accurate                                 
description of the world. Although the community may change or alter a limited number of the                               
connections within the paradigm, it will always retain a number of base commitments that are                             
inviolable and sacrosanct. If one seeks to dislodge one of the base commitments, it will lead to a                                   
transformation in the entire system, rendering something substantially new from what was                       
present before. Understanding the constructedness of paradigms helps to expose potential flaws                       3
in previous approaches toward Islamic societies and law.  
Orientalism as Paradigm 
In advancing its central argument, the traditional Orientalist paradigm entails a number of                         
important assumptions about Islamic civilization and its relation to Western civilization. Firstly,                       
it assumes that there are a set of definable and definite criteria that identify an Islamic society as                                   
opposed to a non­Islamic society. Secondly, it assumes that Islamic civilization is monolithic.                         
Thirdly, it assumes that Islamic societies are stagnant and unable to develop. Fourthly, it assumes                             
that Islam and Islam alone is the defining aspect of all societies that compose Islamic                             
civilization. Fifthly, it assumes that Islamic civilization is homogenous so that any society it                           
designates as Islamic is essentially equivalent in all substantial aspects to another society that it                             
designates as Islamic. Sixthly, it assumes that Islamic civilization is eternally hostile to other                           
civilizational groups, but especially the West. Lastly and most importantly, Orientalism conceals                       









not to say that there is not Orientalist scholarship that made important discoveries or was able to                                 
break out, to a certain extent, from the paradigm as an ideal type. However, the extent to which                                   
some of these empirically­unfounded attitudes have remained in serious scholarship and the                       
public imagination is staggering and cannot be ignored.    4
The Orientalist paradigm argues that major reason why Islamic civilization lagged behind                       
the West was because its schools of jurisprudence were inflexible and actively hostile to                           
innovation. In particular, the Orientalist paradigm emphasizes that, after the establishment of the                         
main schools of Islamic jurisprudence in the ninth and tenth centuries and the subsequent                           
‘closing of the gate of ijtihad,’ Islamic jurists could no longer exercise the independent reasoning                             
necessary to respond to innovation. According to Orientalism, supposed inflexibility and lack of                         5
innovation in the legal sphere gave rise to a civilizational character that, in general, denigrated                             
independent thought and innovation. Furthermore, the Orientalists believe that European                   6
civilization possessed an openness, expressed and guaranteed by its positivistic, secular legal                       
tradition, that allowed it to develop the scientific method and worldview. The scientific                         7
worldview gradually empowered Western civilization and made it dominant among all others.                       
However, in line with the analysis of paradigms above, it seems unlikely that, ​necessarily,                           
Western and Islamic civilization and their legal traditions are as separated and distinct as                           
















constituent aspects of that character like its legal tradition, was the cause of its material                             
ascendancy appears dubious.  
The Limitations of Orientalism 
In line with the nature of paradigms, although one can delineate the elements that                           
compose the class of Islamic civilization, one forms the class not by appealing to a definite set of                                   
characteristics that Islamic civilization possess to the exclusion of all other civilizations; rather                         
one forms the class by learning to emphasize and suppress specific characteristics between                         
individual entities that compose classes. For example, certain sects of Islam, particularly Shia                         
Islam, possess a messianic character similar to that present in Christianity. However, in the                           
process of intellectual formation, one learns to suppress the characteristics that Shia Islam shares                           
with Christianity and emphasize the characteristics it shares with other Sunni sects. Whereas,                         
formerly, the observer encountered intersecting, dynamic relationships among a sea of inchoate                       
data, he or she now perceives a series of discrete classes that appear to share little in common                                   
with one another and each constitute a world unto themselves. However, the original dynamic,                           
intersecting relationships between individual entities do not actually disappear; they remain                     
hidden beneath the surface of the paradigmatic apparatus and can re­emerge if one chooses to                             
examine and re­order its foundations. The scholar Edward Said raises this point, albeit in a                             
simplified form, in his response to the Clash Thesis, “The Clash of Ignorance.” Said notes, “​This                               
is the problem with unedifying labels like Islam and the West the [which paradigms like                             
Orientalism and the Clash Thesis propound]: They mislead and confuse the mind, which is trying                             






that.” Therefore, the perceived and actual points of division between Islamic civilization and                         8
Western civilization are more porous and constructed than they may appear upon initial                         
examination.  
The inadequacy of Orientalism does not mean that the researcher must succumb to a                           
postmodern interpretation of reality and intellectual progress. Paradigms are necessary for any                       
form of intellectual progress. However, one must always be attentive to what composes a                           
paradigm and seek to modify it in a way that most accurately describes the character of and                                 
relationships between classes and their constituent entities. At the very least, the nature of                           
paradigms forces the researcher to acknowledge that it is unlikely that different classes, namely                           
Islamic and Western civilization, are as separated as Orientalism supposes. Some have taken the                           
criticism of the traditional Orientalist paradigm to mean that any attempt to understand Islam as                             
an intellectual system is inherently biased. Others have deferred to rosy declarations that Islam is                             
necessarily a religion of peace rather than a dynamic, living intellectual tradition in which                           
multiple actors participate and claim membership. This study seeks to avoid these unfortunate                         
pitfalls and grapple with the history of Islamic law as it has actually occurred.   
Conclusions 
The nature of paradigms makes it likely that Islamic law is open to the same process of                                 
development, contingency, and differentiation as any other legal tradition. Therefore, paradigms                     
that suppose a stark division between entities, like the Clash Thesis, are potentially dubious. As                             
the following empirical analysis of legal reforms in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth                           








that the Orientalists ascribed to it, precisely because it is always located in a contingent,                             
socio­historical milieu. Consequently, theoretical formations that proceed, at least in part, from                       






























Before proceeding further, it is necessary to differentiate between the two types of                         
Islamic law, the ​sharia and ​fiqh​. While some groups disagree, most Muslim scholars consider the                             
sharia to be the over­reaching, pure law that God bestowed to Muhammad and ​fiqh to be the                                 
attempt to apply the over­reaching, universal series of principles and admonitions present within                         
the Qur’an, Hadith, and other sources to specific cases. The process of analogical and innovative                             9
reasoning contained within ​fiqh is particularly important in determining how a Muslim should                         
act in the face of specific scenarios and conditions that were alien to Arabian society during the                                 
time of the Muhammad, those that Muhammad did not encounter and render judgement upon                           
during his life, or developed after Muhammad died. After Muhammad died and without the                           
existence of codified schools of ​fiqh​, or even a single, authoritative version of the Qur'an or                               
Hadith, Muslim rulers ruled and governed in a necessarily ad­hoc manner, especially in regard to                             
new or undelineated conditions. In responding to these conditions, the rulers were practicing                         
f​iqh​, but they did not do so in a systematic way. During the ninth and tenth centuries, as Islam                                     
spread even wider geographically and entrenched itself in the existing institutional and                       
intellectual structures that it encountered, there was an increasing need for systematic                       







train new judges. The need for systematic ​fiqh motivated numerous jurists to create schools of                             
Islamic jurisprudence (​madhhabs​), all of which reflect different “legal discourses and                     
hermeneutic principles.” Thus, there are actually two types of Islamic law: the ​sharia​, God’s                         10
universal, abstract, perfect and all­encompassing law that Muhammad received; and ​fiqh​, the                       
process by which the individual interprets God’s law, systematic versions of which are present in                             
the ​madhhabs​.   11
Islamic law as ​fiqh​, through codifications like the Ottoman ​Mecelle​, is subject to local                           
conditions and thus “shares some features with other legal traditions such as Common Law and                             
other modern legal systems.” Not only is difference of opinion to be expected, but it necessarily                               12
follows from human cognition attempting to grapple with divine knowledge. In the same way                           13
that a modern political theorist writing about democracy would impugn certain characteristics to                         
it, he or she would also acknowledge that local conditions shape the experience of democracy in                               
a way that differs from the generalization. Within the Sunni sect alone, five major schools                             


















no are no longer extent such as the Jariri, Laythi, Awza'i, and Thawri. Additionally, within                             14
Shia Islam, other schools exist such as the Ismaili, Zaidi, and Jafari.   15
The ​madhhabs have reacted dynamically in response to the political, economic, social,                       
and environmental milieu in which they exist. Moreover, ​madhhabs have coexisted along and                         
interacted with non­Islamic legal traditions, such as the Central Asian/Mongolic, Persian, and                       
Roman. However, many Islamic jurists have historically attempted to obfuscate the connection                       16
between Islamic and non­Islamic legal traditions and the connection between the ​sharia and ​fiqh​.                           
The jurists would usually also argue that their own ​madhhab supplied the only accurate heuristic                             
framework to understand the ​sharia​, blurring the lines between two different types of Islamic                           
law and obscuring the extent to which Islamic law existed alongside other non­Islamic legal                           
traditions. The jurists most often did so because to argue otherwise meant undermining the                           17
credibility of their own ​madhhab​. For example, during the Umayyad and Abbasid empires,                         
Islamic jurists argued that the ​sharia was the highest and only true standard of justice and                               
legislation, superseding that of secular rulers and kingdoms. The jurists argued that the ​sharia​,                           18
as the highest standard of ethical conduct, served to circumscribe the actions of secular rulers and                               




















the jurists assigned to Islamic law, its implementation often fell under the purview of the secular                               
state and interacted dynamically with other legal traditions in a larger juridical continuum. While                           
Islamic law has been an important aspect of Islamic societies and governments, it has always                             
operated most strongly in the private lives of subjects, rather than being a determinative                           
constraint upon state policy. Rulers such as Mehmed II of the Ottoman Empire even codified and                               
established legal systems on a primarily secular basis, only to bring them into line with Islamic                               
law during a later period. Importantly, these relationships and patterns of organization were not                           20
peculiar to the Ottoman state; rather they have been fairly common among Islamic states and                             
societies in historical and contemporary environs.  
The Experience of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Empire 
The experience of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire further validates the contingent                         
nature of Islamic law. Before the nineteenth century, Islamic law, mostly under the Hanafi                           
madhhab​, reacted dynamically and in tandem with strong traditions of customary and statutory                         
law within the Empire. Moreover, conditions peculiar to the Ottoman state left their indelible                           
mark upon the expression and character of Islamic law. Both of these factors set the stage for the                                   
unique transformations that Islamic law underwent in the Empire during the nineteenth century.   
Initial Orientalist scholarship emphasized the degree to which purely Islamic concepts of                       
jihad and the frontier­warrior, or ​ghazi​, were the primary basis of Ottoman identity, legitimacy,                           
and authority. However, with further scholarship, it has become apparent that the Ottoman state                           
not only was integrated into the existing “political and economic environments of Europe and the                             







drawing on the entire legacy of Turko­Irano­Islamic kingship as well as [its] Byzantine                         
heritage.” For example, the Ottoman frontier­warrior, ​ghazi identity drew upon the embattled                       21
attitude that the Islamic world assumed during the search to reorganize itself in the wake of the                                 
Mongol invasions and the “legacy of confusion and anarchy” that had characterized the final                           
days of Byzantine rule. Thus, fundamental aspects of the Empire’s Islamic identity were unique                           22
products of their historical milieu and derived from a partially non­Islamic substrate. Whereas                         
formerly, scholars believed that Ottoman institutions and intellectual currents proceeded on a                       
mostly, if not purely Islamic basis, the present trend has emphasized how non­Islamic elements                           
in the Empire co­existed and evolved with Islamic elements.  
In the Ottoman Empire, the legal traditions of Central­Asian tribal societies such as the                           
Mongols and Turks, and the Persian tradition of law and statecraft were as great influence upon                               
its legal and governmental structure as the Islamic tradition. Situated within a larger                         
“Turko­Irano­Islamic political matrix, Ottoman Islamic law reacted dynamically with                 23
surrounding political, economic, social, and intellectual conditions. The Central­Asian tradition                   
required a ruler to proclaim a set of laws rooted in “tradition and custom” and enforce its                                 
arbitrary, just application to his subjects; the ​yasa ​of Genghis Khan is the archetypal product of                               
this tradition. The pre­Islamic, Persian legal tradition posited that the ruler was absolutely                         24















Abbasid caliphs were previous Muslim rulers who drew upon the Persian tradition. The                         25
Ottoman sultans and their bureaucracy drew upon both of these traditions to govern in                           
conjunction with Islamic law.  
Drawing on the Central­Asian tradition, the Ottoman sultan and his bureaucracy, the                       
Empire’s central executive, regularly issued a series of statutory laws, called the ​kanun​, ​‘urfi​, or                             
sultanic laws. Periodically, government functionaries would distribute new ​kanun from the                     
center to the provincial courts, adding to the existing statutory corpus. For instance, through the                             26
kanun​, the bureaucracy created and structured the tax­farming system that provided the state with                           
its revenues, which did not have precedent in the Islamic tradition, and differed according to                             
local customary laws. The statutory laws served as the primary legal structure of the Empire                             27
and expanded the authority of the executive at the expense of the religious establishment. The                             28
sultan himself and his bureaucracy were often comparatively uninitiated in the intricate                       
structures and exacting details of Islamic law, delegating the duty of retaining and maintaining                           
its corpus to the ​ulema​. Moreover, influenced by the Persian model, the sultan and his                             29
bureaucracy claimed the authority to protect subjects from abuse and so many of the statutory                             



















Whereas, in theory, the Islamic judge (​qadi​) only renders judgement in accordance with                           
the school of jurisprudence to which he ascribes, the Ottoman state entrusted its ​qadis with                             
rendering judgements in consideration of its complete juridical corpus. The ​qadis ​rendered                       
rulings that drew upon statutory, customary, and Islamic traditions. In the process, Ottoman                         31
jurists (​muftis​) often sought to and did bring non­Islamic practices into closer conformance with                           
their schools of jurisprudence. However, while jurists were, in some circumstances, successful in                         
situating the statutory laws within an Islamic discourse and character in some way, they did not                               
change their essential non­Islamic trajectory and character. Additionally, through their                   32
interpretation of Islamic law, the Empire and its religious officials drew upon a highly                           
heterogeneous and diverse medieval Islamic legal tradition. The mix of different traditions,                       33
operating under the supremacy of the sultan’s ​kanun​, statutory laws, characterized all Ottoman                         
legal structures from the fiscal, to the criminal, to the commercial.   34
Nonetheless, Islamic legal frameworks continued to exercise significant influence. For                   
example, the state levied a tax on non­Muslims (​cizye) in exchange for their exemption from                             
military service, rule by their own laws and customs, and protection by the sultan. Moreover,                             35
the state regulated the operation of Islamic charitable entities such as the ​waqf and rendered them                               
largely exempt from taxes for the services they provided to their surrounding communities.                         















was careful to promulgate an official discourse of strict adherence to the faith and often cloaked                               
and justified extra­Islamic practices by appealing to an Islamic discourse. The Islamic                       36
discourse assured the Muslim populace and religious establishment that the basis of all Ottoman                           
law was the ​sharia and that the sultan, in serving as its ultimate executor and successor to the                                   
caliphate, was the defender of the faith. The heavy discursive emphasis upon the ​sharia may                             37
have been a principal reason why European observers began to blend together ​fiqh and ​sharia​,                             
rendering Islamic law, in their minds, a monolithic, unchanging system.  
As the preceding evidence demonstrates, within the Ottoman Empire, Islamic Law                     
interacted with numerous other traditions of law and governance. Not only did the traditions                           
coexist among each other, but also they exerted an influence upon one another, leading to new                               
developments. However, ideas are only one component that shapes the expression of Islamic law                           
in a given context. Institutions are also vitally important.  
The Empire’s Arbiters of Islamic Law 
The institutional character of the Ottoman Empire had a significant impact upon its                         
Islamic legal tradition. From its inception, the Empire was distinguished in its “elaborate                         
administrative apparatus with a formalized hierarchy of rank and written regulations,” with the                         
apparatus extending “authority from the imperial court, to the administration, of the provinces,                         
from fiscal affairs to military provisions.” Within the context of its centralizing tendency, the                           38
state extended its administrative apparatus to control over the religious establishment that                       











Empire’s institutions led to a unique relationship between the the dominant Hanafi school and                           
the state, which was markedly different from prior relationships between ruling dynasties and                         
madhhabs​.   39
Prior to the Ottoman Empire, ruling dynasties had supported specific jurists or ​madhhabs​,                         
but they did not take a part in shaping the actual content of the ​madhhab ​itself to suit its interests                                       
and preferences. In contrast, the Hanafi ​madhhab rose to prominence in the Empire only after                             40
the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent proclaimed the restructuring of the legal system in                         
accordance with it and declared it to be the Sunni Muslim orthodoxy. The state itself would also                                 
actively restructure the doctrine of the Sunni Hanafi school in line with its imperial objectives so                               
that it, in effect, Hanafi Sunni Islam became Ottoman Sunni Islam. More broadly, the advent of                               41
greater levels of state­control over ​madhhabs may have been part of a larger pattern that took                               
hold in South and Central­Asian Islamic states during the period, particularly those in which the                             
Hanafi school was dominant. Nonetheless, while state­control over the Hanafi ​madhhab may                       42
have been part of a larger, concurrent phenomena, the fact that the Empire adopted the attitude                               
was highly significant. The Empire would instantiate the normative and system of increasing                         
state control over Islamic life throughout the geographically, ethnically, and intellectually                     
diverse societies and peoples that they controlled, amplifying the importance of the development                         













stronger operating system than comparable Central­Asian or South­Asian states, it was able to                         
implement its normative system more vigorously.  
The Ottoman Empire controlled the ​ulema, ​the arbiters of Islamic law, by making its                           
members a branch of the state itself. In contrast to other Islamic societies, the Ottoman state                               
managed the education, salary, and appointments of the ​ulema​. Within the religious bureaucracy,                         
there was a vast and far­reaching stratification of rank with the highest office being the                             
seyhulislam or the mufti of Istanbul. Each judicial center in the provinces retained a ​qadi and,                               
oftentimes, the ​qadi of a particular judicial center would also serve as mayor and chief of police.                               
However, the ​qadis found their political and administrative role within the state circumscribed                           43
by administrative supervisors (​hlul­emr​). The ​seyhulislam, ​the Empire’s chief jurist, issued                     44
fatwas​, rulings or determinations made in accordance with Islamic law, oversaw the                       
implementation of Islamic law throughout the state, and headed the Office of the ​Seyhulislam​.                           45
The state issued numerous “laws, decrees, and local orders” for the writing and preservation of                             
documents, registrations, and fees of ​qadis and ​sharia courts. Holders of high religious offices                           46
such as the ​seyhulislam​, the ​qadiaskars ​of Rumelia and Anatolia, and the chief provincial ​qadis                             
were theoretically equal in rank to corresponding members of sultanic bureaucracy, such as the                           
















However, the vast religious establishment was still another branch of the Ottoman bureaucracy,                         
which the state controlled and directed towards its larger objectives as much as it could.  
Given its control over the character and expression of Islamic law, the Ottoman Empire                           
used it to defend its authority against competing sources of solidarity from domestic and foreign                             
Muslim populations. While, though the ​millet system, the Empire made relatively generous                       
allowances of autonomy to certain non­Muslim populations, it sought to keep a tight grip over                             
Islamic religious life. Whenever heterodox Islamic populations appeared to gain a substantial                       
base of support that challenged the authority of the center, the state deported or placed                             
restrictions upon them in order to fragment their organizational structure. For example, the                         48
Alevi​, or Qizilbash​, Shia sect supported policies of decentralization, which would allow religious                         
and political autonomy for its communities. In response, the state viewed the ​Alevis​’ religious                           
heterodoxy and the “alternative source of solidarity” that it supplied, as a threat to the integrity of                                 
the state. Thus, in the Ottoman context, rather than the Islamic law serving as an outside check                                 49
on the power of the state, as was the classical interpretation, it served as a mechanism by which                                   
the state could exercise its power. Indeed, it was the oppressed, heterodox Muslim populations                           
such as the ​Alevis who were the groups who were most likely to hearken back to the view of                                     
Islamic law as a tool to circumscribe the power of rapacious rulers and the fundamental source of                                 
all law. The Empire also appealed to its custody over the true Islamic orthodoxy to legitimate                               50













institutional relationships between the Ottoman center and periphery, divergences from official                     
state policy existed. This was especially true in the Maghreb and Eastern Arab provinces wherein                             
the Maliki and Shafii ​madhhabs respectively continued to exercise significant influence.                     52
However, the major trends and differences in the experience of Ottoman Islamic law, especially                           
compared to previous and contemporary Islamic societies, is clear.  
Conclusions 
In order to understand the nature of Islamic law in a specific society, one must pay                               
attention to the socio­historical milieu in which it is situated. While the ​sharia​, the concept that                               
God’s divine knowledge is present in the Qur'an, the Sunna, and other texts, is unchanging and                               
monolithic, ​fiqh​, the human attempt to understand that knowledge, changes according to local                         
conditions and circumstances and is the actual Islamic law that has been operative in Islamic                             
societies. Since the Islamic law that ​madhhabs express is the latter rather than the former,                             
Islamic law, and Islamic civilization as a whole, is not necessarily unchanging or monolithic.                           
The further development and evolution of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire underscores the                           
contingent character of Islamic law.  
In the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law interacted with many different legal traditions such                         
as the Central Asian, Persian, and Roman, forming the foundations of the state’s ability to                             
articulate and propound sovereignty. Moreover, in the Empire, the religious establishment was                       
an extension of the state apparatus rather than being an extra­governmental institution. The                         
presence of many legal traditions and the religious establishment’s close relationship with the                         







what constitutes it. For example, the Ottoman ​ulema​’s relationship with the state contrasted                         
markedly with that of the neighboring state of Qajar Iran whose ​ulema ​exercised significantly                           
more autonomy and were, in a real sense, an extra­governmental institution. The differing                         





























Given the breadth and variability of Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire, it does not                             
appear it was necessarily less capable of development or change than its Western equivalents or                             
separated from other traditions of law in the way that the Clash Thesis maintains. Moreover, as                               
the Ottoman central government had a history of significant control over the religious                         
establishment, it seemed to possess the ability to undertake and enact systematic Islamic legal                           
reforms. Given that these appraisals are reasonably well­founded in the historical and                       53
methodological evidence, the question naturally emerges as to why a fusion of Islamic and                           
Western law did not occur during the age of nineteenth­century Ottoman reform and why instead                             
the state embarked on a trajectory that would lead to the secular program of Mustafa Kemal and                                 
his followers. While the Orientalist paradigm and the Clash Thesis contend that the Kemalists                           
rejected Islamic law in order to be able to embrace Western modernity, the actual forces at work                                 
that led to the marginalization and abolition of Islamic law appear to be more complex.  
The Ottoman legal reforms of the nineteenth century were part of a wider series of                             
policies known as defensive modernization or defensive developmentalism. Perceiving a threat                     









defend against European intervention, conquest, and economic peripheralization. The Ottoman                   54
reform movements of the nineteenth century, and the later Kemalist regime, were similarly                         
characterized by the attempt to rationalize institutional functioning and centralize authority after                       
large­scale decentralization that had occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.                     
The Empire’s successive military defeats at the hands of aspiring and existing European empires                           
and the subsequent, gradual cession of many of its most valuable European and Mediterranean                           
domains further heightened the reformist impulse. In this regard, the Empire, given its                         55
administrative and institutional history, was in a stronger position than many non­European                       
societies, especially compared to neighboring Near­Eastern states like Qajar Iran who were                       56
highly decentralized or the states of the Arabian peninsula who had fewer resources to defend                             
against the European advance.  
During the nineteenth century, Islamic legal reforms in the Ottoman Empire emerged                       
within the context of centralization and modernization. The struggle for sovereignty and legal                         
independence was epitomized by the fight against the Empire’s infamous capitulations to                       
European states. At the time of the initial reforms during the nineteenth century, the Empire had                               
previously granted various extraordinary powers and privileges to European states and their                       
representatives. While these privileges had formerly been minor impositions upon Ottoman                     
sovereignty, they became more pronounced over time in relation to Europe’s rising material                         












sovereignty, which threatened the ability of the state to remain functionally or nominally                         
independent of European suzerainty. For example, in the case of a dispute involving a foreigner,                             
the consular courts of the foreigner’s nation would arbitrate rather than the Ottoman courts,                           
granting them favorable terms of justice. Moreover, the embassies excluded many of their                         57
citizens from having to pay the state’s taxes and conforming to its regulations. The privileges                             58
also allowed embassies to abuse treaty agreements granting special privileges to the embassies’                         
dragomans​, which caused deep and widespread abuse, particularly in Ottoman commercial                     
centers. In the wake of the creation of such a favorable commercial status, Ottoman citizens                             59
began to petition European embassies to purchase ​dragoman status so that they could ignore                           
Ottoman laws, giving them a comparative advantage over their competition.  60
The capitulations allowed European states to establish protective status over the                     
increasingly restive non­Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. The nationalistic impulse                     
led to ever­increasing numbers of rebellions and attempts at secession, which drove the Ottoman                           
state deeper and deeper into the arms of European creditors both for the costs incurred during the                                 
fighting and for the lost revenues from ceded territories. The protective status not only eroded the                               
state’s control over its subjects, but also lead to increased European intervention in the its                             


















established a model of using political pressure and financial compensation to support Ottoman                         
political figures who would serve their aims and represent their interests, fracturing the internal                           
integrity of the state apparatus. Thus, as European economic and political power became more                           62
prominent, the issue of the capitulations, both in functional and optical terms, became                         
progressively more acute. 
In order to restore its sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire sought to reform its courts and                             
legal codes so that it could arbitrate disputes involving foreign nationals in its own courts. In this                                 
way, the state would both retain elements of its indigenous law and institutions, and be able to                                 
defend its sovereignty against European expansionism. Importantly, the initial pressure to                     
accommodate the Europeans meant that the subsequent attempt to reform the Ottoman legal                         
system would have to involve the importation of Western legal principles and codes. These                           63
local conditions were decisive in shaping the future of Islamic law in the Empire.  
The Course of Reform 
At the beginning of the reform process, the Ottoman Empire established courts in its                           
great commercial centers to address the extraterritorial privileges that the capitulations afforded                       
European embassies and collaborating Ottoman citizens. In order to bring the Europeans into the                           
Ottoman legal system, the Empire instituted mixed (​Nizamiye​) courts that would employ                       
European­style codes, colored in part by the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. During the                           64












Nizamiye court system through a reflexive process that included monitoring of irregularities,                       
disciplinary measures taken against transgressing officials, and a continuous reconsideration of                     
daily judicio­administrative practices.” In 1867, the state passed legislation permitting                   65
foreigners to acquire and own property with the stipulation that all disputes involving property                           
would now be tried in Ottoman courts. In 1869, the Ottoman state passed a law creating the                                 66
institutions of citizenship, thus making it illegal for Ottoman citizens to seek the extraterritorial                           
status permitted under the capitulations. By the 1870s, the state had instituted European­style                         67
commercial courts in the major centers of trade and commercial activity, including Izmir, Edirne,                           
Selanik, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo. In terms of legal rationalization and                       68
centralization to meet the challenge of European powers, the process was generally successful in                           
erecting a legal framework that reasserted Ottoman sovereignty while accommodating growing                     
European economic interests, which could not be ignored.  
While the Ottoman Empire had, at first, intended that European codes be limited to the                             
Nizamiye courts, Ottoman reformers and European elites began to desire and implement their                         
outright transplantation into its legal system. Reformers drew upon the ​Nizamiye model and                         69
created new domestic courts that utilized European codes. French codes laid the basis for the                             

















Procedure (1861), and the Code of Maritime Commerce (1863). The legal reformers preferred                         70
the French codes because they were the most comprehensive and widely­used European codes                         
available at the time. Significantly, the Empire was the first muslim­majority state to                         71
implement a European legal code of its own accord rather than being a colonial imposition.                             72
Similarly, Egypt, in imitation of the Ottoman center, instituted ​Nizamiye courts in 1875 and                           
domestic courts on the same model in 1883, both of which drew mostly upon European codes                               
and partly upon islamic jurisprudence. Through drawing upon Western legal traditions, the                       73
reforms of the nineteenth century introduced openly secular legislation rather than the cloaked                         
secular legislation of the kanun​. However, as Chapter 1 and 2 illustrate, the change constituted                             74
more of a transition in the relative influence and configuration of different legal traditions and                             
principles that were already present in the Empire rather than a true break with what had come                                 
before. As an additional consequence, the introduction of more secular elements did not                         
necessarily mean the marginalization of those with a religious basis. 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire continued to                         
Westernize its legal system. With the accession of sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876 ­ 1909), the                               
Empire’s discourse became much more visibly Islamic than it had been under the previous                           
Tanzimat elites. ​However, despite a changing discursive emphasis and increased religious                     
















Instead of integrating Islamic law into the European codes, during the reign of Abdulhamid II,                             
“much of the constructive work of the Tanzimat was continued and extended.” In a similar way                               75
to Meiji Japan and other non­European states undergoing European­style modernization,                   
Abdulhamid II attempted to retain an Ottoman, Pan­Islamic identity with Western institutions.                       76
The later Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (r. 1908 ­ 1918) continued the process of                               
modernization along European lines with a marginalization of Islamic law. In 1916, the state                           
transferred all ​sharia courts, which had been left to arbitrate matters of personal status and                             
family matters, from the ​seyhulislam to the direct administration of the Ministry of Justice and                             
the Islamic schools to the Ministry of Education. After World War I, Mustafa Kemal and his                               77
followers seemingly brought the process of escalating Westernization and modernization to its                       
logical end by declaring Islamic law to be illegal and instituting another series of European codes                               
as the single constitutive element of the Turkish Republic’s legal system.  
While the majority of the Ottoman Empire’s reformist elites were satisfied with the                         
marginalization of Islamic law from political life and the transplantation of European legal                         
codes, a minority wanted to pursue a more gradualist trajectory. The minority wanted to                           
reinvigorate the Empire’s legal framework and and fuse its Islamic heritage into the fabric of a                               
modern, centralized state. The leader of the minority group was the ​Tanzimat official Ahmed                           













(Law Collection). Cevdet’s life and actions outline the course of gradualist reform that could                           
have occurred in the Empire. 
Ahmed Cevdet  
Despite his importance to the Ottoman age of reform and later Islamic legal                         
developments, the life of Ahmet Cevdet life has garnered a less­developed literature than most of                             
his contemporaries. In the words of one writer, Cevdet was truly “one of the most underrated                               
men of the ​Tanzimat period.” Cevdet was a unique figure in that he bridged the administrative                               78
world of the Westernizing reformists with the academic world of the religious establishment, the                           
ulema​. Supplementing his Islamic educational base, Cevdet studied the legal traditions of                       
individual European countries, with a particular emphasis on that of France, and international                         
law. Through his experiences, Cevdet came to believe that the Empire had to modernize, but                             79
also thought it was possible to achieve modernization through modifying and adapting the                         
indigenous legal system rather than the wholesale transplantation of European codes. When                       80
Mustafa Resit, the architect of the ​Tanzimat​, wanted to find an expert in Islamic law who had the                                   
flexibility to be able to accommodate his reformist agenda and diffuse opposition from the                           
















From 1858 onward, under the tutelage of Mustafa Resit, Cevdet gained administrative                       
experience to supplement his academic base. When he began his sixth term as grand vizier, Resit                               
made Cevdet a member of the Council of the ​Tanzimat​, the chief engine of reform in the Empire.                                   
Cevdet utilized his legal education by creating and administering numerous institutions in a way                           
that combined the Ottoman Empire’s Islamic institutional and legal heritage with European                       
equivalents. Specifically, in regard to law, Cevdet created “regulations on land ownership and                         
cadastral surveys” and “was the principal author of the regulation that created the new Supreme                             
Council of Judicial Ordinances in place of the Council of the ​Tanzimat​” to which he would                               
accede as a member, along with serving in a series of administrative posts of increasing power                               82
and prominence.  
The Mecelle 
In 1868, Ahmed Cevdet served as the chairman of the commission tasked with creating a                             
new European­style law code that incorporated Islamic legal principles for the Ottoman Empire.                         
Prior to the convening of the commission, Cevdet played a significant role in convincing the                             
sultan that “the new civil law code should be based on principles derived from Islamic law,                               
modernized to meet current realities.” Cevdet and his colleagues’ administrative and academic                       83
experience allowed them to forge a powerful fusion of Islamic and Western law in the tradition                               
of the earlier, pre­reform juridical continuum that had existed in the Empire, but also marked a                               
unique development in the history of Islamic law. From 1869 to 1876, the state enacted the                               










The composition and release of the ​Mecelle marked a new era in the history of Islamic                               
law. Previously, Islamic law had not operated as a statutory law in the sense of setting precedent                                 
and establishing legislation, was not codified along European structural lines, and did not operate                           
off the increasingly positivistic, in contrast to naturalistic, foundation that European legal                       
systems were expressing. Instead, ​fiqh was the attempt to interpret and organize the ​sharia                           
according to specific interpretative principles that the ​madhhabs established and, in certain cases,                         
modify those principles to meet changing realities. In the traditional framework, when a ​qadi                           
issues a ​fatwa​, the ​fatwa is not binding for all cases of a similar nature in the future; rather, it                                       
only serves as a judgement in the individual instance and relies for all its power upon the ​qadi​’s                                   
“personal religious authority.” In this regard, the Islamic juristic tradition stands in contrast to                           84
the European traditions of Common Law and Civil Law. When a Common Law judge delivers a                               
ruling, he or she sets a precedent that other judges utilize and when a Civil Law judge delivers a                                     
ruling, he or she does so according to a set of established statutes that contain a fairly limited                                   
field of possible interpretation. Civil Law, which structured the transplanted French codes, is                         
“grounded in rationality and it is objectively enforced by the rational judgements of competent                           
tribunals” with judges as “executors of this law [who] have themselves no claim to represent the                               
charismatic authority of powerful individuals.” In this way, the ​Mecelle combined Islamic legal                         85
principles with the structure of European Civil Law, generating a new transformation in the                           











to “European models of the state and administration of justice,” it is important to recognize that                               86
the Islamic juristic legal tradition had coexisted and co­evolved with statutory traditions since the                           
establishment of the first ​madhhabs​. For example, the Ottoman ​kanun was a type of statutory                             87
law that had existed alongside the juristic law of the Ottoman Sunni Hanafi ​madhhab and others                               
for centuries. Thus, the main way that the nineteenth­century European legal traditions differed                         88
from those that had already been present in the Empire were their positivistic orientation.                           
However, the extent to which previous statutory laws like the ​kanun expressed and were truly                             
conceived under the principles of natural law rather than those of legal positivism is still unclear.  
Cevdet and his colleagues were the first in the history to take Islamic legal principles, as                               
established by individual ​madhhabs​, and establish them as a type of statutory law. Cevdet and                             
his colleagues drew upon the Civil Law tradition of Europe, as expressed through various French                             
codes, as their statutory context. In this way, the ​Mecelle was an attempt “to codify the rules of                                   
contract and tort according to the Hanafi school, combining European form with Shari’a                         
content.” The new type of Islamic law would differ from the juristic process of ​fiqh because it                                 89
would now rely for its authority on the extent to which the ​qadi enforced established legislation                               
rather than almost purely upon his expertise and education. The process of codification was also                             
significant in its own right. The ​Mecelle included “sixteen books addressing the issues of sales,                             
















“simplified a huge part of the relevant principles and made them more accessible to litigants and                               
jurists.” Excepting family law, which the ​Mecelle left to the domain of the traditional ​sharia                             91
courts, the ​Mecelle​ constituted a comprehensive civil code.   92
The ​Mecelle​ also innovated in its application of existing Islamic legal principles.  
Within Islamic law, ​tahhayyur is the practice of incorporating rulings and principles from                         
different ​madhhabs according to what the jurist determines to be relevant and correct. Before                           93
the ​Mecelle​, the application of ​tahhayyur had been fairly common within the ​madhhabs                         
themselves, but the composition of the ​Mecelle marked the first time that the jurists had used the                                 
practice to matters of Islamic law relating to state policy. In the context of the ​Mecelle​, the use                                   94
of ​tahhayyur became associated with selecting the Islamic legal principles of that “seemed most                           
suitable to the prevailing conditions of society.” The revised definition allowed Islamic legal                         95
scholars to select the rulings and principles that would facilitate accommodation between                       
Western political and economic institutions while retaining Islamic influence. More broadly, the                       
methodology of the ​Mecelle would fuel a larger trend toward eclecticism within Islamic law and                             



















tahayyur​, codification, and the recasting of Islamic law as a statutory tradition would heavily                           
influence subsequent attempts to reform Islamic law during the process of modernization. 
During the remaining history of the Ottoman Empire, there were some other important                         
legal developments in Islamic law, the most prominent of which was the Ottoman Family Law of                               
1917. Following the model of the ​Mecelle​, the authors of the Family Law used the principle of                                 
tahayyur to select individual rulings from different ​madhhabs​. However, whereas the ​Mecelle                       
had drawn upon those of the established ​madhhabs such as Hanafi, Shafi, and Maliki, the authors                               
of the Family Law expanded ​tahayyur to include individual jurists that operated outside of the                             
dominant ​madhhabs​. Specifically, the Family Law drew upon the rulings of Mu’tazli scholars                         97
on the issue of guardianship in marriage.   98
Despite the ​Mecelle​’s comprehensiveness, vitality, and level of compliance that it was                       
able to inspire, Ahmed Cevdet and his colleagues failed to stem the rising tide of Westernization.                               
In the wake of the ​Mecelle​’s promulgation, Cevdet found himself profoundly disenchanted with                         
the inability of the ​Tanzimat to stem the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and its                               
domination by European economic and political interests. European states in particular                     99
continued either to flout the Ottoman codes or force the state to assume a more aggressively                               
European orientation. As the century wore on, it seemed to many domestic elites and foreign                             














While the process of re­centralizing its authority may have constrained its ability to                         
institute Islamic legal reforms, the Ottoman Empire was able to inspire substantial compliance in                           
both its central and outlying provinces. From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century,                           
local elites had carved out their own semi­autonomous states that sought to implement reform on                             
their own terms. While the center, theoretically and legally, had authority over provincial                         
governments, it often did not possess the power necessary to enforce its policies, especially in                             
the more peripheral provinces of North Africa and the Levant. Therefore, the extent and                           100
character of Islamic legal and institutional reforms in a given area depended upon the existing                             
relationship with the Ottoman center and local conditions. For example, in response to the                           
Tanzimat Decree of 1839, Muhammad Ali, the ruler of Ottoman Egypt, agreed to grant his                             
subjects the civil rights that the ​Tanzimat Decree instituted, but reserved the right to interpret the                               
Decree in terms of its applicability to cases and codification into law. In 1841, desiring more                               101
vigorous compliance with its reforms, the Ottoman center capitulated and issued a specific                         
decree allowing Ali to modify his reform process “in accordance with the requirements of the                             
locality and the principles of justice.” In other cases, provincial developments in Islamic law                           102
















However, while provincial elites had more authority the further from the Ottoman                       
Empire’s center they were, there appears to be a rough uniformity in the process of                             
nineteenth­century legal reform and acceptance of reforms from the center. For example, while                         
Muhammad Ali and his descendants had the power to institute legal reforms as they pleased,                             
Egyptian reforms proceeded along almost the same lines as those in the Ottoman center.                           104
Moreover, the ​Mecelle​, the Ottoman civil code that Ahmed Cevdet composed remained active in                           
the Empire’ former Arab domains for the next sixty years, with Israel being the last to abolish it                                   
in 1984. Even if the Empire may not have been able to enforce its legal reforms through an                                   105
operative system of law, it was able to erect a normative system that motivated its outlying                               
subjects to adopt them and may have influenced the behavior of neighboring or constituent states                             
like Ottoman Egypt. As a corollary that is relevant to discussion about the possibility of Islamic                               
legal reform during this period, it does not appear to be the case that limitations of authority                                 
would have prevented the Empire from applying Cevdet’s approach to the rest of its law codes.  
Conclusions 
The rise of Europe presented new challenges to the Ottoman Empire and significant,                         
sweeping transformations in its legal system. In particular, the increasing economic and political                         
power of European states caused the gradual erosion of Ottoman sovereignty. In response, the                           
Empire attempted to strike a middle way of reform between appeasing European interests and                           
retaining its Islamic identity through through reforming its legal system. While Ottoman                       











involving foreign nationals, the process soon intensified with the outright transplantation of                       
European codes into the Ottoman legal system, resulting in a strengthening of the statutory                           
tradition of law whose lineage lay in the ​kanun​. Simultaneously, a minority of legal reformers,                             
such as Ahmed Cevdet, aspired to preserve the parity between Islamic and non­Islamic legal                           
principles that had historically existed in the Empire. However, ultimately, the promulgation of                         
the ​Mecelle was an intellectual and institutional anomaly within the larger movement toward the                           


























As the preceding section demonstrates, Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire continued to                         
be dynamic, situated, and interactive with evolving conditions during the period of nineteenth­                         
century reform. In spite of the power and attraction of European codes, there was still a dedicated                                 
group of reformers like Ahmed Cevdet who capitalized upon the Empire’s syncretic legal                         
history, the reception of foreign novelties, and reinterpretations of existing principles to recast                         
the Ottoman Islamic legal tradition, and Islamic law more generally, into a new form. The                             
process of transformation yielded the Empire’s civil code, the ​Mecelle​.  
Given that the ​Mecelle existed, the question emerges as to why the Ottoman Empire did                             
not implement its intellectual and methodological model more widely and why, instead, the state                           
slowly proceeded down the path of rising Westernization. The answer lies in the proximity of                             
European states and their rising power within the world­system along with numerous obstacles                         
that generated instability in the Ottoman state, which invited further intervention and seemed to                           
confirm the supremacy of the West, its institutions, and its laws. Whereas the prior chapter                             
demonstrated the impact that European proximity to the Empire had upon the impetus for legal                             









The major challenge that confronted the Ottoman Empire’s attempts at creating a fusion                         
of Islamic and Western law was the rise of Europe. As their control over Islamic societies                               
increased, European states used the opportunity to implant their legal and administrative systems                         
because doing so supported their material and ideological objectives.  
As Chapter 1 explained, two of the key elements of the Orientalist paradigm are that all                               
Islamic societies are essentially the same and that they cannot substantially change. Within the                           
minds of Europeans who were either intentionally or unintentionally ignorant of the Empire’s                         
syncretic legal history, the Orientalist paradigm necessarily precluded the possibility of Islamic                       
legal reform. More broadly, the Orientalist paradigm that European states assumed toward                       
Islamic societies was part of a larger pattern, stretching back to the colonization of the Americas,                               
in which they denigrated and rendered invisible the legal systems of non­European societies.                         106
Insofar as non­European societies and states did not possess systems that reflected European                         
traditions of statehood, sovereignty, and law, European states did not recognize them as                         
constituting true systems; rather they considered indigenous systems as ad­hoc, inefficient, and                       
unenlightened confluences of customary practice or as nonexistent. In the few cases that the                           107
Europeans did recognize indigenous legal traditions as constituting systems, as they did in the                           
case of their interactions with Islamic societies, they asserted that they were inherently incapable                           












superiority of their systems and the inferiority and irregularity of the indigenous systems to                           
justify legal transplantation.  
Expressing the Orientalist paradigm, European colonial officials within the Ottoman                   
Empire believed that, despite the work of those such as Ahmed Cevdet, efforts to reform Islamic                               
law were in vain because it could not be reformed. For example, British consular reports                             109
charged the Ottoman state with being unable to implement Westernizing reforms, let alone                         
construct an effective fusion of Islamic and Western law. In 1880, one British consular official                             
charged, “The populations in Anatolia are not in a sufficiently advanced state of intellectual                           
development to understand the beneficial purpose of laws framed in a more liberal spirit that the                               
existing ones.” Reports such as these are important because they not only express the                           110
Orientalist paradigm that colonial officials possessed toward the Ottoman Empire’s legal system,                       
but also demonstrate their profound lack of knowledge of it with frequent mistakes and                           
mischaracterizations about the most fundamental of details. Thus, it is possible that the basic                           111
assumptions of the Orientalist paradigm created expectations with the minds of the colonial                         
officials despite the absence of evidence to confirm them. As European colonial elites precluded                           
the possibility of reform, some also firmly believed that it was their mission to bring modernity                               
to non­European societies through reforming the legal apparatus of non­European societies.                     112















re­making of Islamic societies, which benefited the growth of their political and economic                         
power. Further integration between the European center and the periphery meant that                       113
European states would become even more powerful and dominant. Therefore, the Orientalist                       114
paradigm supplied the ideological base for legal transplantation, and material and humanitarian                       
impulses would supply the impetus.  
Of course, it is also important to recognize that the ability of European states to act upon                                 
these aims rested upon the comparative power of their institutions and material resources in                           
relation to non­European societies. During the period of colonialism, if a non­European state                         
could take advantage of technological and intellectual innovations from the West, as was the                           
case in Meiji Japan, it was more likely to be able to retain its sovereignty and aspects of its                                     
indigenous identity than states who were not able to do so as effectively, as was the case with                                   
neighboring Qing China. Consequently, it is important to examine the Ottoman Empire’s                       
reaction to the rise of Europe, which would affect its ability and desire to retain Islamic law.  
Ottoman Elite Attitudes 
One of the major difficulties confronting Islamic Law in the Ottoman Empire during the                           
nineteenth century was that its elites were very receptive to the Orientalist paradigm from                           
Europe, which encouraged the marginalization and abolition of Islamic law. Historically, the                       
elites of the Empire had played a decisive role in establishing and maintaining its legal apparatus.                               
Moreover, other than being the historically powerful force at the top of the state apparatus,                             











reform because they “perceived [themselves] as the only source for the revival of the Ottoman                             
state and the idea it represented.” Whereas the Ottoman public was not necessarily in favor of                               115
the legal reforms that elites undertook, the elites were, because of their power in society, able to                                 
act upon their beliefs and desires to move into the direction of reform that they desired. Given                                 116
the cursory historical and intellectual survey at the beginning of this analysis, it would seem                             
obvious that the Ottoman elites did not believe that Islamic law was monolithic and unchanging.                             
However, in the late Empire, most Ottoman reformers drew upon the the Orientalist paradigm                           
from Europe, which would influence the types of reforms that they would propose and initiate.  
The majority of the Ottoman Empire’s elite reformers came out of the bureau of                           
translation and correspondence with European states, in which they imbibed Western ideas about                         
non­Western societies like Orientalism. Thus, the elites believed that the only way to be                           117
reform was to integrate the Empire into European networks and that the only way to do so was                                   
by adopting European economic, political, and social models. In doing so, the Empire would                           118
become a power equal to the European states. As a necessary corollary, most of the elites came                                 119
to believe that Islamic law was backward and could not meet the emerging needs of a modern                                 




















Specifically, in line with the Orientalist idea about the decline of ​ijtihad​, Ottoman elites believed                             
that Islamic law could not adapt to meet the needs of European economic institutions and                             
practices. Accordingly, even though, intellectually and empirically it was questionable                   121
whether there was a necessary link between modernity and the marginalization of Islamic law,                           
the elites sought to reform upon European lines. ​Another major internal obstacle to the Empire’s                             
attempts to reform its legal institutions and to do so on the basis of a fusion of Islamic and                                     
Western law was the institutional barrier between the Western­oriented elites and the ​ulema​.  
Institutional Barriers Between Ottoman Reformers and the Ulema 
When the ​Tanzimat commenced, the Ottoman Empire’s religious offices did not                     
experience the same level of the development and empowerment that other Ottoman ministerial                         
departments underwent. Even before the alienation of the ​ulema during the nineteenth century,                         
there were significant institutional divisions between the religious and administrative                   
establishment of the empire, especially in regard to top positions. For example, during the entire                             
history of the Empire, Ahmed Cevdet was the only person to transition to the rank of ​vezir​, an                                   
administrative office, from the rank of ​kazasker​, a religious office. Rather than strengthening                         122
existing religious institutions or leaving them alone, the state actually undermined, weakened,                       
and marginalized them. In 1839, the state established the Council of State, in part, in order to                                 
weaken the Office of the Seyhulislam and the ​ulema​’s relative standing within the Ottoman                           











decline led to the decline of Islamic law as well. In the legal sphere, the Westernizing reforms                                 123
widened the existing gap between statutory law, which traced its institutional lineage to the                           
earlier ​kanun​, and Islamic law. The judicial reforms also tended to reduce the judicial power of                               124
the ​qadis and ​muftis​, especially in view of the administrative and judicial power they had                             
possessed during the preceding seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1870, the state                       125
founded the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice, depriving the ​ulema of much of                               
their administrative role. More generally, the state tended to co­opt the members of the ​ulema                             126
who possessed the greatest early promise, encouraging a general decline in the vibrancy of                           
religious institutions. Accordingly, while the high­ranking ulema initially supported the reform                     127
attempts of Selim III (r. 1789 ­ 1807) and Mahmud II (r. 1808 ­ 1839), they began to feel                                     
alienated by the speed of modernization, especially with the extent to which reformers were                           
importing European principles, traditions, and institutions into the Empire. Consequently, the                     128
ulema became more intellectually conservative and hostile toward any type of reform, even an                           
approach that would imbue the European­style institutions with some semblance of Islamic base.  
Ahmed Cevdet’s involvement in the administration of the Ottoman Empire also met with                         
considerable hostility from the ulema itself. Because of its marginalization under the                       

















bureaucracy and, thus, was betraying the interests of the institution as a whole. Consequently,                           
Cevdet faced significant opposition, envy, and hostility to his involvement in spheres of conduct                           
such as military and administration, which went beyond the traditional spheres of the ​ulema​,                           
such as education, scholarship, and juridical study. It had been rumored that Cevdet, because                           129
of his prominence in the religious establishment, was in line to assume the leadership of the                               
ulema by becoming the ​seyhulislam​, chief ​mufti of the Empire, but the conservative leadership                           
prevented his proposed appointment because he possessed a more liberal orientation. Given                       130
the alienation of the ​ulema from the state apparatus, Cevdet was remarkably unique in that he                               
was one of the few Ottoman reformers who received religious training in the ​ulema and still                               
possessed the reformist spirit of many in the state apparatus. Thus, the hostility that developed                             131
between the ​ulema and the state, and the co­option of the best minds into the state apparatus,                                 
generally prevented other figures like Cevdet from arising who might have sought to incorporate                           
Islamic law into the Empire’s other legal codes.  
Economic Weakness and Fragility 
Another key aspect of Europe’s challenge to Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire was                           
economic. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state attempted to correct what it                         
perceived to be the “misrule and inefficiency of provincial administration” that had developed                         
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly the devolution of power and fiscal                         













significant challenges in modernizing and centralizing its fiscal structure through the abolition of                         
tax­farming. On February 7, 1840, the state reorganized the old tax system so that, whereas it had                                 
previously based taxes on a mix of Islamic, statutory, and sultanic law, it now based them on a                                   
fixed ratio according to taxpayer's income and capacity to pay. However, the new system                           133
faltered because the tax­farmers saw little incentive to transfer their existing knowledge and                         
relationships within rural districts to their successors from Istanbul. The difficulty to                       134
reorganize the fiscal structure early on was particularly problematic as the Empire found itself                           
engaged in multiple wars on its European frontier. If the Empire had possessed a more                             
centralized, efficient fiscal base at the beginning of the century, it would not have been forced to                                 
borrow as heavily as it did from European creditors.  
The strength of European economies combined with comparative Ottoman fiscal                   
weakness yielded a potent combination for increased Western legal influence in the Ottoman                         
Empire. In the face of an increasingly poor economic position, Ottoman reformers believed that                           
reforming the Empire’s legal system along European lines would allow indigenous industry to                         
compete more effectively by easing access to foreign markets. However, “legal reform made it                           135
easier for European merchants to do business locally” and “deepened the marginal economic                         
position of the Ottomans in the emergent global economy.” Beginning with an 1838 free­trade                           136















goods, displacing indigenous industry with a superior economy of scale and more sophisticated,                         
powerful modes of production. In response to the increasing relative value of resources to                           137
European markets, Ottoman markets increasingly consolidated around the exportation of raw                     
materials, drawing away capital from the already beleaguered industrial sector. However, as                       138
the process continued, the terms of trade worsened with the Ottoman markets receiving                         
manufactured goods that were less valuable than the raw materials that they were exporting.                           
Moreover, the foreign direct investment that the Empire received was intended almost                       
exclusively to meet the demands of European investors who were focused upon                       
resource­exportation and manufacture­importation, and the infrastructure necessary to expand                 
and deepen the system. In order to secure the investment, the Ottoman state also had to pay                                 139
disproportionately high interest rates of interests on its loans and commit itself to a                           
disproportionately high number of contractual guarantees to European creditors. In short, legal                       140
reforms intended to assert Ottoman sovereignty and independence from the imposition of foreign                         
control, although conceptually sound and thorough, lacked the capacity to meet the creeping                         
power of European states.  141
One prominent example of these trends was the downfall of the Mehmet Ali regime and                             
the British occupation of Egypt. Seeking to strengthen his domain against European invasion, Ali                           















economy upon the production of cash­crops such as cotton, which the state could export to                             
European consumers; he did so with the hope that there would be sufficient capital accumulation                             
to fund eventual domestic industrial production. As in the Ottoman Center, Egyptian elites                         142
established a European legal apparatus in order to settle disputes between European merchants                         
and Egyptians, facilitating increased trade and investor confidence. While Egypt’s economic                     143
growth greatly increased, its lack of economic diversity and highly unequal contractual                       
agreements with European creditors meant that even a small economic disruption could drag the                           
whole state into default. Eventually, continued economic reversals led to European creditors                       144
taking over management of the economy, which inspired a fierce backlash among the Egyptian                           
people who eventually toppled Ali’s regime. In 1882, the breakdown in order led to British                             145
occupation and cession. Once the British took control of Egypt, they reformed its legal system to                               
integrate it further into their empire. Whereas, before the British takeover, the Egyptian state had                             
limited Western legal principles and institutions to the the ​Nizamiye courts, in 1883, only one                             
year after they took control, the colonial government instituted native courts along European                         
lines, relegating Islamic law to ​sharia​ courts that only arbitrated matters of personal status.   146
The Ottoman center suffered from a similarly poor economic position and, thus, while                         
not undergoing a European takeover, experienced a similar pattern of events, which lead to                           
















fifty years of constant conflict with European states and nationalities who sought to partition it,                             
gradually weakening the state’s institutions and ability to resist foreign domination. The                       147
almost constant state of conflict forced the Empire to issue large amounts of debt to remain                               
solvent, in addition to the debts it had already incurred to fund its economic modernization                             
projects. By the 1870s, the Ottoman state was spending 60% of its annual tax revenues just to                                 148
pay down the ever­increasing burden. In an echo of the Egyptian case, the Empire’s combined                             149
debts became so excessive that, in 1881, European powers forced the state to establish the                             
Ottoman Debt Commission whose members represented the interests of foreign bondholders.                     
The Commission possessed “extraordinary power to use tax payments to reimburse foreign                       
investors” and with its establishment, “the Ottoman Empire essentially ceded control of its                         
finances to Western Europeans.” Throughout this period, the extent of legal transplantation                       150
generally increased and it does not appear to be coincidental that the extent of legal                             
transplantation and, hence, the extent of Islamic law, in many different Islamic societies, such as                             
the Ottoman Empire, corresponded to the Europeans’ material objectives rather than Islamic                       
law’s incompatibility with that of the West.  
Reforming its legal system along European lines, although optically necessary to                     
accumulate the capital necessary to compete with European manufacturers, actually facilitated                     














Empire had less capacity to institute Islamic legal reform and codification, which both European                           
and Ottoman elites believed would undermine their interests.  
Conclusions 
During the nineteenth century, European states expanded their influence in the Ottoman                       
Empire to support their material and ideological objectives. In this process, legal transplantation                         
served a vital role because it facilitated the growth of European economic and political influence.                             
European states supported legal transplantation by arguing that the legal systems of                       
non­European societies were either non­existent or could not be reformed. Among the many                         
Islamic societies that European states attempted to influence and control, the Ottoman Empire                         
was unique in its ability to ability to remain comparatively sovereign until its dissolution after                             
World War I. As a result, the Empire, unlike other Islamic societies of the period, was able to                                   
undergo a limited process of Islamic legal reform. Although its scope was limited, the ​Mecelle                             
demonstrated the conceptual and institutional viability of Islamic legal reform despite the                       
objections of Ottoman reformers and European elites.  
However, as the century progressed, Ottoman reformers became more convinced of the                       
superiority of Western law, the institutional barriers between the ​ulema and the elites became                           
more ossified, and the Empire fell deeper under the influence of European creditors and                           
governments, all of which contributed to the move toward legal transplantation. As a result,                           
specific conditions that were largely unrelated to Islamic law’s intellectual viability or ability to                           
co­exist with other traditions of law led to its marginalization. At the very least, local conditions                               






































After World War I, Mustafa Kemal and his supporters wrested control of Anatolia away                           
from other competing factions and sought to continue the Westernizing trajectory of their                         
Ottoman reformist predecessors. In their attitude toward Islamic law, the Kemalists shared “the                         
drive toward centralization, regularization, and monopolization, which were pursued by the late                       
Ottoman and early republican governments.” However, the Kemalists differed principally                   151
from their bureaucratic and intellectual predecessors in their comparatively higher level of                       
hostility and paranoia they expressed toward religious institutions. One reason for the Kemalists’                         
attitude was ideological. In creating a Turkish nationalist identity, the Kemalists wanted to                         
distance themselves from the Ottoman Empire, particularly in regard to the primacy of religion                           
in shaping the state’s discursive identity and institutions.   152
The other major reason for the Kemalists’ more thoroughgoing secular attitude was                       
pragmatic. In the wake of World War I, with the near partition of the Anatolian core of the                                   
Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Allied powers, the Kemalists were especially attentive to                             












intervention and partition. In part, the Kemalists pursued a more vigorous Westernizing program                         
than their predecessors because opponents of their regime often appealed to a traditional Islamic                           
identity as the basis of their authority and sought to co­opt Ottoman religious institutions for                             
leverage. Importantly, as with the Westernizing trajectory of nineteenth­century legal reform,                     153
Kemalist secularism was a policy that emerged over time in response to changing conditions; in                             
this case, the policy originated from growing perceptive threats from Islamic institutions rather                         
than a necessary movement toward secular, modernity. The fact that the Kemalists expressed                         
Pan­Islamist attitudes during the initial founding of the Turkish Republic until their opponents                         
began to used Islamic institutions to challenge them tends to support the abolition of Islamic law                               
as a contingent phenomenon.  
On April 23, 1919, a Grand National Assembly convened in Ankara and elected Mustafa                           
Kemal as president. During this initial stage, the nationalists professed their loyalty to the Sultan                             
and the Caliph. In accordance with Ottoman rituals, the Assembly sacrificed sheep, held a public                             
recitation of the Qur’an, and displayed relics of the prophet in a processional march. However, in                               
response to the declaration of a republic, the ​seyhulislam in Istanbul issued a ​fatwa decrying the                               
nationalists and urging true believers to destroy them; on May 1, the Istanbul government                           
similarly condemned Kemal and his supporters to death. However, support for the Ankara                         
government increased in the wake of the Greek advance into Anatolia, which greatly undermined                           
the legitimacy of the Istanbul government. On July 2, further co­opting the religious legitimacy                           







foreigners and expel them from the country. Later, in December 1919, Mustafa Kemal made a                             154
speech in which he appealed to the remaining populations of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim                             
Kurds and Turks, to band together in pan­Islamic unity.   155
However, during a cabinet meeting on October 31, 1922, Kemal announced that the only                           
way forward for the Turkish nation would be to abolish the sultanate, neutralizing the power that                               
the Istanbul regime possessed. The next day, November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly                           
separated the office of the sultanate from the office of the caliphate. In doing so, Kemal wanted                                 
to deprive the Istanbul faction of any leverage that it possessed in determining the future of the                                 
country by undermining its legitimacy, but wanted to proceed carefully in order to not alienate                             
cultural conservatives. Having lost one institution with which they could oppose the regime,                         
Kemal’s detractors circled around the caliphate as an alternative mechanism to gain power.                         
These opponents encouraged the caliph to petition Mustafa Kemal for expanded powers and a                           
defined role within the new Turkish state. Realizing that his opponents would now use the                             
caliphate, rather than the sultanate, to oppose him and the Turkish Republic, Kemal responded                           
sharply and decisively. When the caliph petitioned Mustafa Kemal, he issued a public                         
proclamation stating, “Let the caliph and the whole world know that the caliph and the caliphate                               
which have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence … The position of                               
Caliphate in the end has for us no more importance than a historical memory.” On March 3,                                 156












the Caliphate to exist as an office and institution only if it did not challenge his nationalistic,                                 
Westernizing program. When the caliph and his supporters appeared to pose a threat to the                             
stability of the nascent republic, Kemal’s secularizing attitude heightened considerably. As                     157
time passed, Kemal prohibited political parties who challenged his program and made                       158
advocating for reincorporation of the ​sharia into the legal system a criminal offense. The                           159
Penal Code of 1926 set out specific penalties for those who “by misuse of religion, religious                               
sentiments, or things that are religious considered as holy, in any way to incite the people to                                 
action prejudicial to the security of the state, or form associations for this purpose.”   160
Attempting to secure their authority and undermine their political opponents, the                     
Kemalists energized the process of legal transplantation that had begun during the nineteenth                         
century. Early in the history of the republic, the Kemalists had attempted to create a new Turkish                                 
legal code, but the Ministry of Justice submitted a draft that expressed substantial influence from                             
Islamic legal principles, similar to Ahmed Cevdet’s ​Mecelle​. Rather than drawing exclusively                       161
upon the French codes, as the Empire had done with its legal transplantation, the Turkish                             
Republic drew upon many different European legal codes, finding the ones would best reflect the                             



















code, based on the Swiss civil code; on July 1, 1926, the state instituted a new criminal code,                                   
based on the Italian criminal code; and instituted a commercial code based on the German                             
commercial code. Finally, whereas the original 1924 Turkish Constitution identified Islam as                       163
the state religion and declared the National Assembly’s obligation to enforce Islamic law, in                           
1928, the state declared the separation of ​din wa dawla​, “religion and state,” and proscribed the                               
legal quality of religions within the state. The state retained ​waqfs or religious foundations, but                             164
now assumed the majority of their revenues and later abolished them in the mid 1930s.  
The Kemalists also eliminated the religious offices that oversaw the arbitration of islamic                         
law. On March 3, 1924, the state eliminated the state­funded ​ulema by vacating their remaining                             
contracts and pensioning them off. On April 8, 1924, a National Law Court Organization                           
Regulation (​Mahkeme Teskilati Kanunu​), abolished the ​sharia courts, vacated the judges’                     
contracts, and transferred their jurisdiction to the the secular court system. During the same year,                             
the state also abolished the office and position of ​seyhulislam and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs                               
and Religious Foundations, replacing it with the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The state                         
mandated that the Presidency of Religious Affairs would be under the direct control of the prime                               
minister and that its role and functions would sharply curtailed. 
Despite the marked changes to Islamic law that it implemented, the Kemalist regime still                           
exhibited its continuity with the Ottoman experience. In addition to the ideological and                         
pragmatic impetus for reform, the Kemalists expressed the Ottoman heritage of substantial                       
control over Islamic law’s development and the institutions that oversaw it. Kemal and his                           









organs of state and the media to create a Turkish nationality with which the people could                               
identity. The Kemalists used Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to propagate a version of                             165
“enlightened islam,” which would provide a moral code for society, but not invade that                           
nationalist, secular public sphere. After the establishment of the DRA, the state sought to                           166
reduce further the heterodox communities and practices such as the Sufis. Rather than                         167
supporting an alternate form of solidarity, Islam would constitute part of secular solidarity. In                           168
the public­sphere, the explicitly nationalist discourse dominated while the                 
progressively­oriented, Sunni Hanafi discourse fused itself into the private lives of citizens. As                         169
a result, the relative ease with which the Kemalists were able to eliminate Islamic law depended                               
substantially upon the specific context of Islamic law in the Ottoman legal system.  170
While the secular program of the Kemalists conceived of the traditional relationship                       
between religion and state in a new way, it maintained an ideological and genealogical                           
consistency with what had come before. Kemalism represented a gradual evolution in the                         
ideology of reform from one that attempted to marginalize Islamic law through a largely                           



















entirely new foundations. However, the desire to establish ideological and institutional                     171
authority, and not material or intellectual necessity, catalyzed the move to abolish Islamic law.  
Islamic Law in Arab States After World War I 
After World War I, differences in local conditions gave rise to divergent developments in                           
Islamic law among the domains of the former Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, the Kemalists sought                             
to identify national identity with a pre­Islamic, Aryan past and prevent political opponents from                           
using Islamic law to mobilize against them. As a result, the Kemalists recast religion as                             
belonging purely to the private sphere rather than being an integral part of national life, as it had                                   
been in the Empire. According to the Kemalists, since religion was to be a part of the private                                   
sphere, the laws of the new republic were to have no basis in Islamic law. Conversely, in the                                   172
Empire’s former Arab­majority domains, nation­building entailed identification with a glorified                   
past in which the prophet Muhammad, as the father of the Arab people, and his accomplishments                               
were integral. Therefore, the Arab nationalists, in contrast to the Turkish nationalists, tended to                           173
support reconciling Islamic and Western traditions of law in a discursive and institutional                         
capacity.  
In constituting new legal codes, the Arab reformers drew upon the models that Ahmed                           
Cevdet and other Ottoman reformers had created with the completion of the ​Mecelle​. The most                             
prominent of these Arab reformers was the Egyptian jurist ‘Abd al­Razzaq al­Sanhuri. Using an                           
approach that was highly influenced by Cevdet’s framework, Sanhuri drafted the Egyptian Civil                         











Law of 1960/1. In Egypt, whereas the civil code instituted during the nineteenth century had                             174
been “the superimposition of a Western Civil Code on traditional Islamic institutions,” the legal                           
code of the mid­twentieth century “was a closer integration of the foreign and traditional                           
elements in that system … designed to serve the needs of a modern, developing nation.”                             175
Importantly, Sanhuri justified his approach of Islamic legal modernization by arguing that                       
Islamic law was one of the great systems of law, equal in stature to the Civil and Common law                                     
traditions of Europe.  176
Ahmed Cevdet’s influence on Sanhuri and the Arab reformers is undeniable. Sanhuri                       
created legal codes that framed Islamic legal principles within a European apparatus instead of                           
the juristic model that had predominated before Cevdet. Sanhuri also drew upon Cevdet’s use                           177
of ​tahayyur to apply the Islamic principles that were most in line with conditions present in                               
contemporary society, especially within the post­colonial context and among distinct states with                       
varying conditions. The principle of ​tahayyur ​would also prove immensely influential among                       178
twentieth­century Arab jurists. Arab jurists used ​tahayyur to compose many national family                       179
laws, whereby Hanafi­dominant states drew upon both Maliki and Hanafi rulings on divorce and                           



















autonomy. The ​Mecelle itself would also serve as one of the principal sources for various                             180
Middle­Eastern civil codes such as the Iraqi Civil Code. In the Francophone Islamic world,                           181
jurists like Marcel Morand drew upon the ​Mecelle to construct their own compilations of Islamic                             
law. Other jurists in Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) drew upon                             182
Sanhuri’s revision of Cevdet’s model in their own revisions and codifications of islamic law.   183
The Legacy of the ​Mecelle​ in Contemporary Debates on Islamic Law 
Since the composition and institution of the ​Mecelle​, scholars of Islamic law have                         
differed as to the way forward. Some advocate for the establishment of pre­​Mecelle juridical                           
independence whereby individual ​qadis can issues ​fatwas according to their legal expertise and                         
muftis issue judgements in regard to novel or unclear issues. This oppositional line of thought                             
traces its origin, in part, to the original reaction against codification in the late nineteenth                             
century; the most vigorous expression of intellectual revolt against Ahmed Cevdet’s reforms                       
occurred in Yemen where Zaidi imams cited its promulgation as justification for revolts in 1891                             
and 1904. Others advocate for the institution of Islamic law along the lines that the ​Mecelle                               184
established whereby legislators compile Islamic legal principles from individual ​madhhabs and                     


















excessive eclecticism in Islamic law post­Cevdet. Moreover, scholars debate whether the                     185
transformation of Islamic law into a statutory tradition demonstrates the vitality and adaptability                         
of Islamic juridical principles or represents a contamination by alien traditions and co­option by                           
outside actors. In many states, these differing conceptions have come into conflict. One                         186
prominent instance of this tension occurred when the King Ibn Saud attempted to establish the                             
interpretations of several Hanbali jurists as statutory law for all other ​qadis​ to follow.   187
Conclusions 
After World War I, evolving conditions within the nascent Turkish Republic lead to                         
Islamic law’s further marginalization and eventual abolition. In contrast, differing conditions in                       
the Ottoman Empire’s former Arab regions lead to alternate developments. Arab legal reformers                         
sought to continue the project of Ahmed Cevdet by combining Islamic legal principles with a                             
European statutory form. Significantly, the fact that these Arab reformers were able to seize upon                             
Cevdet’s model and states instituted codes based on it tends to undermine the view that Islamic                               
law does not and cannot co­exist with other legal traditions. The difference in outcomes also                             























As this historical survey demonstrates, Islamic law derives much of its character from                         
local political, economic, social, and environmental conditions. Within the Ottoman experience,                     
Islamic law was situated within a Sunni Hanafi tradition that interacted dynamically with                         
Central­Asian, Iranian, and other non­Islamic traditions. During the nineteenth century, multiple                     
legal traditions continued to operate within the Ottoman Empire with a more vigorous European                           
influence than before. However, the European tradition did not establish itself as the dominant,                           
and eventually sole, basis for legislation as part of a necessary move toward modernity as                             
Orientalism and the Clash Thesis would suggest. Instead, growing instability within the Empire                         
and the efforts of pro­Western Ottoman elites increased the European hold over the state,                           
gradually leading to legal transplantation. Nonetheless, Ahmed Cevdet and a small group of                         
reformers drew upon the rich intellectual history of Islamic law, particularly the experience of                           
Ottoman Islamic law, to create a new synthesis of Islamic legal principles and Western                           
structures. Although the conditions within the late Ottoman Empire precluded the restoration of                         
Islamic law, different conditions led to Cevdet’s framework to be integral in the attempts of Arab                               
legal reformers to incorporate their Islamic heritage into the fabric of Western modernity.  
Insofar as, throughout its existence, Islamic law has shaped and been shaped by                         
surrounding conditions, the divisions between different civilizations that Orientalism and the                     






fact that Islamic law depends so thoroughly upon local conditions makes it difficult to determine                             
the degree to which the legal systems of various states draw upon it. In most states that currently                                   
employ or draw upon Islamic law, the division between European, Islamic statutory law, and                           
Islamic juristic law is often unclear and amorphous. The constitution may declare that the ​sharia                             
is the fundamental basis of all legislation and, in the absence of prescribed statutes, all judges                               
should defer to its principles. However, the actual effect and character of the Islamic elements                             
within the legal code are not readily evident until one has conducted an exhaustive survey of the                                 
individual system. Even with multiple assessments by top legal scholars, it has been difficult to                             
establish an academic consensus. At the very least, this study undermines the value of                           
considering Islamic law as an ideal type in academic and policy analysis, which composes a vital                               
part of Orientalism and a constituent part of the Clash Thesis.  
Looking forward, this relatively cursory study into the development and character of                       
Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire will help to challenge the Orientalist and culturalist                           
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